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INTRODUCTION

In order to give approximately 1,400,0001 health care employees
the protection enjoyed by employees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Congress amended the Act in 1974 to make

health care institutions2 "employers.1 3 Recognizing the public's
dependence upon the unique services provided by health care facilities, Congress was hesitant, however, to extend coverage under the
Act to health care employees without providing additional safeguards. These safeguards are embodied in the following special provisions: (1) the extension of the sixty-day notice requirement for
1. Carroll, Health Care Institution Coverage Under the National Labor RelationsAct,
38 TEX. B.J. 257 (1975); Vernon, Labor Relations in the Health Care Field Under the 1974
Amendments to the NationalLabor RelationsAct: An Overview andAnalysis, 70 Nw. L. REv.
202 (1975).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp. V 1975) defines a health care institution as "any hospital,
convalescent hospital, health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care of sick, infirm, or aged persons."
3. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, § 1(a), 88 Stat. 395 (amending 29 U.S.C. §
152(2) (1970)).
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modification of an expiring contract to ninety days;4 (2) the creation
of a thirty-day notice requirement of a dispute when bargaining for
an initial contract following certification;5 (3) the imposition of a
ten-day notice requirement prior to striking in both expiring and
initial contract negotiations; 6 (4) the involvement of the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) early in the proceedings;' (5) the delegation of discretion to the director of the FMCS
to appoint a board of inquiry;8 and (6) the imposition of a duty on
the union to participate in the mediation efforts of the FMCS.9
The explicit purpose of these provisions is to facilitate the
collective bargaining process in the health care industry.' 0 Implicitly, Congress devised the amendments to achieve two potentially
antithetical objectives-to ensure the continuity of patient care"
and to furnish employees with an arsenal of economic weapons.' 2
The conflict inherent in the implied objectives is manifested by the
health care strike.
Although Congress recognized that strikes would occur' 3 and
included in the amendments extraordinary safeguards to regulate
all interplay between a health care institution and its employees
prior to a strike,1 4 it intentionally declined to regulate strikes.' 5 Assuming a strike is confined in scope, such a policy of inaction seems
consonant with the basic purpose of the employee protections embodied in the NLRA. If, however, a strike is directed at the only
hospital in a large rural community; or at large, highly specialized
hospitals providing treatment for very limited types of patients who
cannot be adequately cared for at other area facilities; or at one
hospital whose services are larger and more extensive than other
available services in an area; 6 or at the majority of hospitals in a
community because they aided the primary employer, 7 the societal
4.
5.

29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 158(d)(B).

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. § 158(g).
Id. § 158(d)(C).
Id. § 183(a).
Id. § 158(d)(C).
See id. 99 158(d), 183; Carroll, supra note 1, at 258; Vernon, supra note 1, at 209-

10.
11. See generally 120 CONG. REc. 12,939-40 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at
12,970-73 (remarks of Sen. Taft and Sen. Dominick).
12. See notes 50-59 infra and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 12,970 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
14. See notes 4-9 supra and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 12,939, 12,973 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
16. See generally id. at 12,971 (remarks of Sen. Dominick).
17. See generally id. at 12,935 4remarks of Sen. Cranston).
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repercussions are greater and the equities may change, thereby necessitating regulation. 8
This Note will focus on these exceptional strikes, which can be
classified as "emergency strikes," and will evaluate alternative proposals for legislative intervention and regulation. To ascertain the
source of this legislation, historical and current perspectives on
health care industry strikes will be presented, the 1974 amendments
to the Act will be summarized and analyzed, and possible sources
of regulation under existing state and federal law will be examined.
II. HEALTH CARE STRIKES IN PERSPECTIVE
To understand fully labor relations in the health care industry
under the 1974 amendments, it is important to examine the climate
in the industry prior to 1974. A high incidence of strikes occurring
in health care facilities emphasized the need for coverage under the
NLRA. For example, most of the strikes occurring in nonprofit hospitals averaged thirty-two days and caused 3,967 idle employee
work days for each struck facility.'9 In the absence of federal legislation, the states retained power to control health care industry strikes
that arguably affected the health and safety of their citizenry."0
Some legislatures enacted regulatory schemes ranging from absolute
prohibitions against walkouts by any hospital personnel2 1 to specific
prohibitions against certain personnel whose services were, in the
legislature's judgment, more critical. 21 Moreover, upon application
to its courts, a state often could obtain injunctive relief to curtail a
strike.23 In spite of these statutory and judicial prohibitions, many
18. See generally id. at 12,971 (remarks of Sen. Dominick).
19. According to representatives of the Service Employees International Union, 95% of
these strikes were recognitional in nature. Id. at 12,936 (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
20. As will be demonstrated in this Note, the states were not able directly to seize an
industry after the Supreme Court's decision in Division 1287, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street,
Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963).
21. Examples of state statutes that absolutely prohibited walkouts are: MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 179.36 (West 1966); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 713, 716 (McKinney 1977); WASH. RV. CODE
ANN. § 49.66.060 (Supp. 1976). See Note, Guidelinesfor Alleviating Local-Emergency Work
Disruptions, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 173, 176 (1974). Although these statutes have not been
repealed, they would be pre-empted by the NLRA. See text accompanying notes 70-83 infra.
22. Examples of statutes allowing specific hospital personnel to strike are found in
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, § 9A (West 1971), and in Indiana, see Peters
v. Poor Sisters of St. Francis, 148 Ind. App. 453, 267 N.E.2d 558 (1971). See also Note, supra
note 21, at 176.
23. An example of the issuance of an injunction against a walkout by hospital employees by a state court is found in League of Voluntary Hospitals and Homes v. Local 1199, Drug
and Hospital Union, 84 L.R.R.M. 2988 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afj'd, 490 F.2d 1398 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1973). See Note, supra note 21, at 176.
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strikes occurred illegally."
Commentators analyzing the potential impact of strikes on the
health care industry emphasized that fears concerning the societal
repercussions of such strikes were exaggerated and that strikes did
not need to be regulated by emergency measures.2 5 Benjamin Taylor, writing in 1971, stated that an emergency in the health care
industry was "probably more of an emotional danger than an actual
one. ....,1To support his reassuring conclusion, Taylor studied
bed capacities at various hospitals and calculated that the hospital
industry as a whole could absorb the patients of a struck facility
with only minor inconvenience since hospitals often operated below
optimum occupancy level. He also reasoned that all elective surgery
could be postponed. Finally, Taylor thought it improbable that all
hospital employees would belong to the same union and thus proposed that hospital employees could be replaced or transferred from
one facility to another for the duration of a strike."
Of the three reasons proffered by Taylor to justify his conclusion that the threat of an emergency in the health care industry had
been exaggerated, only the second reason, relating to postponement
of certain nonemergency operations, remains valid in light of the
1974 amendments. If hospitals, complying with Taylor's solutions to
problems created by strikes, transferred patients to other facilities
or hired and borrowed replacement personnel from other facilities,
the aiding hospitals could be struck under the "ally doctrine,"
which allows a union to extend its economic activity to any employer whose employees perform work that would have been performed by striking employees but for the existence of a labor dispute. 8 Illustrating the application of this doctrine, the Committee
report on the proposed amendments suggested that a secondary
employer who lends a primary employer employees with critical
skills, such as EKG technicians, might not lose its status as a neu24. See generally 120 CONG. REC. 12,973 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
25. See, e.g., Taylor, Emergency Disputes Involving Privately Owned Local Level
Services, 22 LAB. L.J. 453 (1971).
26. Id. at 457.
27. Id. at 457-59.
28. Reading excerpts from the committee report on the proposed amendments into the
record, Senator Cranston recognized this possibility:
It has been held that where during the course of a labor dispute, a secondary employer
performs work that, but for the existence of such labor dispute, would have been performed by the striking employees of the primary employer, the secondary employer loses
his status as a neutral, and the labor organization is entitled [under the ally doctrine]
to extend its economic activity to the secondary employer.
120 CONG. REc. 12,935 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
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tral. 21 Conversely, a secondary employer would "enmesh" itself in
the primary dispute if it provided supervisors, nurses, or other staff
of a non-critical nature." In the absence of congressional guidelines
for classifying critical versus non-critical occupations, one can only
speculate as to the scope of permissible aid that one facility may
render to another. Nevertheless, one possible consequence of the
ally doctrine is that a strike begun against a single primary employer could be transformed into a large-scale community or areawide strike involving all facilities exceeding these ill-defined boundaries. Thus Taylor's reassuring conclusions devaluing the importance of health care strikes need reassessment in accordance with the
1974 health care amendments.
El.

THE

1974

HEALTH CARE AMENDMENTS

Congress hoped to reduce the number of strikes occurring in the
health care industry by enacting extraordinary provisions governing
the relationship between health care institutions and their employees.' Of primary importance for purposes of this Note are sections
8(d), 8(g), and 213. To gather the import of these sections, it is
necessary to summarize briefly the provisions of the 1974 amendments and their relationship to a potential emergency strike. Essentially, the amendments internalize three cooling-off periods and
provide for early intervention by the FMCS.
Section 8(d)(A) requires a ninety-day notice of a party's intention to modify an expiring contract and to negotiate a new one. 2
Although the comparable notice period in other industries is sixty
days,3 3 Congress felt that section 8(d)(A)'s longer notice period
would provide more time for negotiation and mediation and serve
to avert a strike.3 4 If the parties are unable to reach an agreement
within thirty days, they are required to notify the FMCS and appropriate state agencies. 5 Under section 8(d)(C), the FMCS is directed
to employ mediation and conciliation to bring the parties to agreement. During this period, the parties cannot strike, and they must
participate in the FMCS meetings in good faith. 6
29.

Id.

30. Id.
31.
32.

See, e.g., id. at 12,939 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(A) (Supp. V 1975).

33. Id. § 158(d)(1).
34. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 12,939 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at 12,971
(remarks of Sen. Taft).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
36. Id. § 158(d)(C).
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Because of the unique nature of the health care industry, Congress further enacted section 8(d)(B) requiring a labor organization
to give thirty days notice to the FMCS and appropriate state agencies whenever there is a dispute in the negotiation of an initial
contract. 7 Although Congress had not imposed this thirty-day notice requirement on other industries, it believed that this additional
safeguard would help to avert health care strikes. 8 Section 8(d)(B),
like section 8(d)(A), requires labor organizations to refrain from
striking and to participate in mediative efforts according to the
provisions of section 8(d) (C).
In addition to the 8(d)(A) and (B) notice periods, Congress
enacted section 8(g), which requires a labor organization to give ten
days written notice to the institution and the FMCS "before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work."4
This section has two primary purposes-to provide the FMCS with
another opportunity to mediate the dispute and to allow the employer a few days to make preparations to ensure continuous patient
care."
Under section 213, the director of the FMCS is given discretionary authority to take extraordinary action during the ninety- or
thirty-day period.4" The director is permitted to establish an impartial board of inquiry to investigate an impasse if "a threatened or
actual strike or lockout will, if permitted to occur or to continue,
substantially interrupt the delivery of health care in the locality
concerned. . . . -13 The board has fifteen days to issue a written
report containing its findings of fact and recommendations for settling a dispute.44 After a report is issued, the parties to a dispute
must maintain the status quo for fifteen days, 45 unless they specifi37. Id. § 15S(d)(B).
38. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 12,974 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
40. Id. § 158(g).
41. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 260. Carroll bases his conclusions on NLRB General
Counsel Memorandum 74-49, Guidelinesfor Handling Unfair Labor Practice Cases Arising
Under the 1974 Nonprofit Hospital Amendments to the Act (Aug. 20, 1974), reprinted in
LABOR RELArONS YEARBOOK, 1974, at 343 [hereinafter cited as Guidelines].
42. 29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (Supp. V 1975).
43. Id.
44. The board's functions are comparable to those functions assigned the Board of
Inquiry appointed by the President under the National Emergency Dispute provisions, except
that under the former provisions the board is permitted to make recommendations. Compare
29 U.S.C. § 176 (1970) with 29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (Supp. V 1975).
45. This 15 day period overlaps with the 8(d)(A) and (B) periods and the 8(g) notice to
strike period. Vernon, supra note 1, at 206-07, presents two time charts which clarify this
sequence of events.
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cally agree to do otherwise.
Despite Congress' care to include comprehensive requirements
regarding pre-strike negotiations and mediation in the 1974 amendments, it deliberately refused to impose special limitations on
health care employees' right to strike.47 Congress hoped that the
extraordinary provisions enumerated above would eliminate the

need for strike regulation by reducing the number of disputes actually reaching the strike stage. Moreover, having documented that
ninety-five percent of all pre-1974 health care strikes were recognitional in nature, it believed that giving health care employees recognition under the NLRA would remove that source of strikes.48 Congress, however, recognized that even with extensive pre-strike safeguards, strikes could not be prevented." 9 In fact, it did not want to
Vernon's time chart for the expiring contract is as follows:
Termination
Notice:
90 days prior
to contract
expiration

Notice
to FMCS: 60
days prior to
expiration

Strike
Notice:
10 days
prior to
expiration

Mandatory Mediation

30 days

60 days
60 days

Expiration
of Contract
(and strike)

10 days
1 15 days

Board of
Inquiry Created: 30
days prior to
expiration

15 days

Board of
Inquiry's
Recommendations Issued:
15 days prior
to expiration

Vernon's time chart for the initial contract situation is as follows:
Notice
to FMCS

Strike
Notice
Mandatory Mediation
30 days

10 days

1

Board of
Inquiry
Created
46.
47.
48.
49.

15 days

Strike

10 days
1

15 days

Board of
Inquiry's
Recommendations Issued

29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (Supp. V 1975).
See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 12,939, 12,973 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
See id. at 12,939 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
Id. at 12,970 (remarks of Sen. Taft).
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prevent all strikes and thereby deprive health care employees of an
important economic weapon permitted by the NLRA. Thus section
8(g) implicitly approves two types of exceptional strikes that can
occur at the end of the ten-day notice period.
The first authorized exceptional strike arises when a health care
institution is guilty of a "flagrant" unfair labor practice.5 1 As an
example, the committee report on the proposed amendments cited
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 52 a case in which the employer
interfered with the employees' right to select their own bargaining
representative. The second exceptional situation in which strikes
are expressly authorized occurs when an employer takes steps to
undermine its bargaining relationship with a union.53 Although a
health care facility is permitted to take steps to ensure that the lives
and safety of its patients will not be jeopardized by a strike, the
facility would exceed permissible bounds if it stocked additional
supplies or hired or borrowed large numbers of replacement personnel from other hospitals54 in an effort to undermine employee concerted activities. According to guidelines issued to the Regional Offices,55 a hospital is to make a written report, listing all preparations
for an ensuing strike, and present this report to the union for its
determination of whether the preparations are excessive." If the
union finds that the preparations are excessive and that the bargaining relationship is thereby undermined, 7 it may call a strike
without waiting until the end of the ten-day period. The outer limit
of "excessive preparations" has not been well defined, and consequently a union striking on this ground places itself in an insecure
50. See New York v. Local 144, Hotel, Nursing Home and Allied Health Services Union,
410 F. Supp. 225, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (Supp. V 1975).
51. Guidelines, supra note 41, at 350. See also 120 CONG. REC. 12,935 (1974).
52. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
53. Although the purpose of the ten-day period is to afford the health care institution
an opportunity to prepare for a strike and ensure the well-being of its patients, Congress did
not intend that the period be used to undermine employees' concerted activities. Senator
Cranston, reading excerpts from the committee report into the record, stated: "Likewise, the
public interest demands that employees of health care institutions be accorded the same type
of treatment under the law as other employees in our society, and that the notice not be
utilized to deprive employees of their statutory rights." 120 CONG. REc. 12,935 (1974).
54. Id.
55. Guidelines, supra note 41.
56. Id. at 31-32.
57. The Guidelines cite the following factors for determining whether an employer has
abused the waiting period: the number of replacements being interviewed and/or hired, the
permanency of the replacements, the number and type of supplies being ordered, the nature
of the patients' illnesses, and the willingness of the union to permit the passage of supplies
and personnel through its picket lines. Id. at 15.
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position. Moreover, such an unexpected strike might endanger the
lives of patients in the struck health care institution.58
The desire to ensure that unexpected strikes do not threaten
patient safety led Congress to contemplate including a special provision relating to "emergency" disputes in the 1974 health care
amendments. The contemplated regulatory scheme consisted of a
cooling-off period analogous to the emergency provisions of the Railway Labor Act.59 Fearing that the inclusion of a cooling-off period
would preclude passage of any of the amendments, proponents strategically omitted this provision" and obtained letters of assurance
from four major labor unions representing health care workers stating their belief that voluntary arbitration would be an appropriate
technique to achieve a settlement. 2
Unfortunately, Congress' reliance on the special provisions regulating bargaining and the letters of assurance from the unions
might be undercut by definitional defects inherent in the statutory
language. First, boards of inquiry, under section 213, must be established during the first thirty days of the 8(d)(A) mandatory mediation period or within the first ten days in 8(d)(B) initial contract
negotiations.6 3 As a practical matter, a strike could not occur during
this period, and thus the determination of whether a board of inquiry should be convened must be made by conjecture long before
a strike actually occurs. 4 Second, section 213 also requires a bargaining "impasse" before a board can be convened. 5 Because most
impasses occur in the final days before a strike deadline, when it is
too late to convene a board of inquiry,6 the utility of section 213 may
.58. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 260.
59. See 120 CONG. REC. 12,939 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at 12,970-73 (remarks

of Sen. Dominick, Sen. Taft, and Sen. Javits).
60. In discussing this omission, Senator Javits stated:
I did not offer such an amendment,. . . because I knew what a storm such an amendment would engender. [Instead] I sought to obtain all the assurance I could get from
the labor unions involved in respect to this particular field as to voluntary action on their
part to deal with this problem.
Id. at 12,939 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
61. The four unions were the National Union of Hospital and Nursing Employees, the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Service Employees International Union, and the
Laborers' Union of North America.
62. Javits also stated that Congress could resort to ad hoc legislation if that were
necessary. 120 CONG. REc. 12,940, 12,973 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
6:3. Vernon, supra note 1, at 212.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 212-13. Although it is technically possible for an impasse to occur in the early
stages of bargaining, it is not likely.
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be definitionally self-limiting. Third, Congress envisioned utilizing
the facts and recommendations of the board of inquiry as the basis
for an arbitrator's determination of the terms of a new contract. 7
If, however, a labor organization refuses to settle a contract because
of its disagreement with the board's nonbinding recommendations,
it is improbable that it will submit to binding arbitration based on
the same findings and recommendations. These problems are not
insurmountable, but they should be noted in evaluating the need for
regulation of emergency strikes.
IV.

POSSIBLE REGULATION UNDER STATE OR FEDERAL LAW

Having shown that Congress did not enact special provisions in
the 1974 amendments regulating strikes, this Note will next examine possible regulatory legislation existing under state or federal
law." The standard of section 213, which is directed at strikes that
"substantially interrupt the delivery of health care in the locality
concerned"69 suggests that the state arguably has the primary interest in regulating a work stoppage in the health care industry. The
two principal alternative methods utilized by the states prior to
1974 to regulate work stoppages were direct seizure of the affected
industry and injunction of the strike."
The first method, direct seizure, enabled a state to seize an
industry and use the National Guard to maintain services whenever
a work stoppage jeopardized the well-being of its citizenry. 7' From
a practical standpoint, direct seizure probably would not be a workable solution to a strike in the health care industry because of the
unique services provided and the high cost of incompetence. In any
event, direct seizure was eliminated completely as a viable alternative by the Supreme Court in Division 1287, Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees v.
67. Id. at 213.
68. In NLRB v. Committee of Interns, 426 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the federal
district court indicated that there is no national labor policy precluding state regulation of
emergency strikes in the health care industry. In determining whether to enjoin a union's
attempt to require a state labor board to assert jurisdiction over certain medical staff not
employees under the Act, the court found that "there is no national labor policy which
requires that housestaff be unregulated by all bodies of labor law and controlled only by the
free play of economic forces." Id. at 453. As a practical matter, however, all state remedies
may be pre-empted by the NLRA.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
70. Note, supra note 21, at 179-85; see notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
71. Note, supra note 21, at 180. This method had been applied mainly to public utility
or transit company strikes.
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Missouri (Division 1287).72 In that case, the governor took possession
under a Missouri statute of a public transit company and directed
it to continue operations. Although the governor and the state court
felt that the loss of the transit company's services would create a
state of emergency, the Supreme Court held that direct seizure was
in conflict with federal law.7 3 Direct seizure of a health care facility,
therefore, should be eliminated as a possible solution to the regulatory problem.
A closer question is presented by the second method previously
available to the states to regulate work stoppages, that of an antistrike injunction. 74 As in the case of industry seizure, the Supreme
Court's holding in Division 1287 is dispositive of the question
whether an injunction against striking employees is a viable regulatory alternative. In Division 1287 the state argued that the statute
under which it sought an injunction to compel striking transit company employees to return to their jobs "represent[ed] 'strictly
emergency legislation' designed solely to authorize use of the State's
police power to protect the public from threatened breakdowns in
vital community services. 75 The state court enjoined the strike,
holding that the public interest, health, and welfare were jeopardized.7" Recognizing the state's obvious interest in the dispute, the
Supreme Court nonetheless held that the state legislation interfered
with federally guaranteed rights and that the state's interest in
preventing a local emergency was not sufficient to create an exception to the pre-emption rule, 77 which requires state courts to decline
jurisdiction over cases arguably subject to the protection of section
7 of the NLRA.
Although the Court determined that the loss of public transit
services did not give Missouri an overriding interest in regulating
the dispute, it recognized certain specific instances in which a state
would possess such interest: "[N]othing we have said even remotely affects . . . the right or duty of the chief executive or legislature of a State to deal with emergency conditions of public danger,
violence, or disaster under appropriate provisions of the State's organic or statutory law." ' It is arguable, therefore, that an emer72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

374 U.S. 74 (1963).
Id. at 82.
Note, supra note 21, at 180-85.
374 U.S. at 80-81.
Id.
Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 83.
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gency strike occurring in the health care industry and endangering
the lives of community members could be distinguished from a
public transit company strike and fit within the Court's exception.
New York v. Local 144, Hotel, Nursing Home and Allied Health
Services Union (Local 144),19 however, a case in point, may further
restrict the applicability of this exception to health care strikes.
In Local 144 New York sought an injunction in state court
restraining the Union from striking the member facilities of the
Metropolitan New York Nursing Home Association. While a temporary restraining order was in effect, the defendant union removed
the action to federal court. The federal district court found that the
1974 amendments demonstrated that federal questions were involved in the dispute between nursing homes and their employees
and that the amendments were intended to pre-empt state law."
Although the state attempted to distinguish nursing home strikes
from less serious labor disagreements by arguing that the amendments "do not cover or pre-empt the State's interest in protecting
its citizens and its exercise of the police power to enjoin strikes in
the public interest,"8' the court, citing Division 1287, held that federal law pre-empted the state's regulatory power and that section
8(g) of the amendments impliedly permitted strikes.82 The holding
in Local 144, applicable to a nursing home strike, presumably would
negate state regulation of health care strikes under ordinary circumstances. If the situation truly endangered the lives of persons within
these facilities, the state's interest might be greater and the situation might be categorized as an emergency meeting the criteria set
forth in the exception to Division 1287.3 With this possible exception, all state regulation utilized prior to 1974 is pre-empted by
federal law.
The remaining current alternative for regulation of emergency
strikes, the National Emergency Dispute provisions of the Labor
Management Relations Act, outlines a procedure to be followed in
the event "a threatened or actual strike . . . affecting an entire
industry or a substantial part thereof. . . will, if permitted to occur
or to continue, imperil the national health or safety. "84 If in the
79. 410 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
80. Id. at 228.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 229.
83. This value judgment is based on the theory that maintenance health care services
provided by a nursing home could be distinguished from emergency room and critical care
services provided by hospitals.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1970) (emphasis added).
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President's opinion the above standard is satisfied, he is authorized
to appoint a Board of Inquiry, which will report to him its written
findings of fact concerning the dispute in question.15 Under section
208, the President then may direct the Attorney General to petition
a district court having jurisdiction of the parties to enjoin the
strike2" Before granting the injunction, however, the court must
find that the strike meets the standard articulated in section 206.87
During the period when the injunction is in effect, the parties
are under a duty, according to section 209, to make every effort to
adjust and settle their differences with the assistance of the
FMCS. s In the meantime, the Board of Inquiry will issue a second
report elaborating the parties' relative positions and the employer's
final offer of settlement. 9 The NLRB then will conduct a secret
ballot election to determine whether the employees wish to accept
the employer's last offer of settlement.9" The results of this election
are certified to the Attorney General, who moves the court to discharge the injunction. 9' If the parties settle their dispute without the
aid of an election, the injunction also will be discharged.9 2 Finally,
the President reports to Congress his recommendations to enable
Congress to take appropriate action.93
The threshold inquiry with regard to a "localized" health care
industry strike is whether the strike satisfies the definitional standard of a national emergency dispute enunciated in section 206. For
the purpose of such inquiry, the standard can be divided into relevant parts. The first requirement to be satisfied involves a determination that the strike in question imperils the national health or
safety." This terminology, unambiguous on its face, has been interpreted and modified by various court decisions. The word "safety"
has become synonymous with defense and the phrase "health and
safety" implies the national welfare,95 which, ironically, was explicitly excluded from the standard in the congressional debates.96 One
85. Id.
86.
87.

Id. § 178.
Id.

88. Id,§ 179(a).
89.

Id. § 179(b).

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. § 180.
Id,
Id.

94. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
95. Jones, Toward a Definition of "NationalEmergency Dispute," 1971 Wis. L.
700, 711-34.
96. Id. at 703-11.
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of the few interpretations of the word "health," isolated from the
remainder of the phrase, appears in Justice Douglas' dissent in
United Steelworkers v. United States,97 in which he stated:
"Congress, when it used the words 'national health,' was safeguarding the heating of homes, the delivery of milk, the protection of
hospitals, and the like."98 Douglas' definition of the word "health,"
unlike an "economic well-being" interpretation, indicates that a
strike in the health care industry is a primary target of the National
Emergency Dispute provisions.
The question of coverage thus depends on whether a strike is
considered to have national ramifications. The guidance afforded by
prior case law must be utilized to determine the significance of the
term "national." In this regard, the National Emergency Dispute
provisions have been used to enjoin strikes affecting a single plant
producing fissionable materials9 9 and a steel strike in which one
percent of the industry's work was defense related.10 At the other
extreme, they have been employed to enjoin a strike affecting shipping on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf Coasts and the Great
Lakes,' as well as a dockworkers' strike involving sixty-five thousand employees.'" 2 Each of these strikes had one factor in common-it affected the national defense or safety.0 3
One commentator has suggested that the liberal interpretation
accorded national safety also should be applied to national health. 4
Health care strikes, however, unlike strikes threatening the entire
nation, probably would be concentrated within a single community.
Even if the ally doctrine widened the scope of the area affected by
the strike, the effect would be at most regional." 5 Health care strikes
thus would be classified as localized, and the National Emergency
Dispute provisions would not apply.
97. 361 U.S. 39, 62 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 65.
99. United States v. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 21 L.R.R.M. 2525 (E.D. Tenn.
1948).
100. United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
101. United States v. National Maritime Union, 15 Lab.Cas. 64,599 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
United States v. National Maritime Union, 22 L.R.R.M. 2306 (N.D. Ohio 1948); United
States v. International Longshoremen's Union, 78 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
102. United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
103. Jones, supra note 95.
104. Id. at 735.
105. See notes 28-31 supra.
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ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

Having determined that Congress did not enact special provisions regulating strikes in the health care industry, that the NLRA
probably would pre-empt state legislation regulating strikes, and
that the localized nature of a health care strike would preclude
regulation under the National Emergency Dispute provisions, this
Note now will focus on possible legislative alternatives that could
be enacted to regulate emergency strikes.' Many of the alternatives
have been proposed and critiqued as possible amendments to the
NLRA. It is important, however, to reassess these alternatives as
possible methods for regulating health care strikes because of the
unique dependence the public demonstrates for the services provided by health care institutions.
In critiquing alternatives and determining which provides the
most appropriate method for regulating health care strikes, the
1 The biases inherwriter necessarily must make value judgments. 07
ent in this Note are: (1) that strikes are desirable economic weapons
and should be curtailed only in true emergencies; (2) that selfdetermination and negotiated dispute settlement are superior to a
governmentally imposed solution; but (3) that a strike jeopardizing
the lives of patients within a health care facility and of the community at large necessitates some form of governmental intervention. This Note will attempt to ascertain the degree and form of
intervention that best satisfy these biases in the regulation of emergency strikes.
A.

Extension of the National Emergency Dispute Provisions

The first alternative is to extend coverage under the National
Emergency Dispute provisions to local health care disputes. The
purpose of these provisions is to avoid work stoppage and use federal
intervention to maintain free collective bargaining and promote
mature bargaining.'"' These goals, taken at face value, would be
106. Senator Javits suggests that ad hoc legislation can be used in particularly "nasty"
situations. 120 CONG. REC. 12,940 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits). See discussion at notes 13547 infra and accompanying text.
107. In order to determine which legislative proposal offers more advantages than another, legislatures also must make both objective and subjective value judgments. This Note,
therefore, will attempt to anticipate the balancing of advantages and uncertainties required
in making such judgments.
108. Rehmus, The Operationof the NationalEmergency Provisionsof the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 62 YALE L.J. 1047, 1048 (1953); Note, The Compulsory Arbitration of Major Work Stoppages, 8 WILLAMErrE L.J. 67, 68-69 (1972).
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consonant with the purposes of the 1974 amendments.' 9
The National Emergency Dispute provisions, however, have
been strongly criticized and might not be the most appropriate
method of regulating health care strikes. Criticism is directed primarily at the procedural scheme to be followed in resolving an emergency dispute. First, critics note that section 206 leaves undefined
the bases for the President's "opinion," which triggers the emergency provisions, and suggest that a more precise standard is
needed."0 The second criticism of the National Emergency Dispute
provisions is directed at the restricted role played by the board of
inquiry. Rather than assisting in the collective bargaining process,
the board merely finds facts to support the President's utilization
of the provisions."' Moreover, the board operates under two primary
restrictions. The time constraints within which it must research and
write its report are too brief for in-depth analysis and permit only
an abbreviated resort to the media to inform the public of the issues
involved in a labor disagreement, thereby eliminating public pressure that normally would be exerted on the parties to settle a dispute. In addition, the prohibition forbidding the board to make
recommendations wastes the talents of its mediators."' The board
could play a more helpful role in resolving emergency disputes if
given a greater length of time in which to assess the criticalness of
a dispute and the authority to make recommendations. 113
The third criticism of the provisions is that the district court,
basing its findings on the board of inquiry's report, -merely rubber
stamps the President's opinion and grants an injunction."' In the
absence of independent judicial application of the standards set
forth in the Act, the procedure for obtaining an anti-strike injunction is based solely on the President's assessment of the emergency
109. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 95, at 702; Marshall, New Perspectives on National
Emergency Disputes, 18 LAB. L.J. 451, 453 (1967).
111. Lewis, Proposalsfor Change in the Taft-Hartley Emergency Procedures:A Critical
Appraisal, 40 TENN. L. Rv. 689, 689 n.3 (1973); Marshall, supra note 110, at 454-55; Rehmus,
supra note 108, at 1055-57.
112. See D. CULLEN, NATIONAL EMERGENCY STRIKES 65 (1968); Rehmus, supra note 108,
at 1055-57. Congress originally feared that recommendations made by the board would assume the authority of arbitration awards and nullify its neutral status in the dispute. See
Rehmus, supra note 108, at 1056.
113. See Marshall, supra note 110, at 455; Rehmus, supra note 108, at 1056-58. Interestingly, the board of inquiry appointed by the director of the FMCS during the 8(d)(A) and
(B) notice periods does perform these functions. 29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (Supp. V 1975).
114. Marshall, supra note 110, at 453; cf. Jones, supra note 95, at 720-21 (district court's
review role analogous to court of appeals review of an administrative agency).
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nature of the dispute." '
The fourth and fifth criticisms are directed at the actual implementation of an injunction and the nature of governmental intervention rather than the decision-making process. For example, commentators characterize the cooling-off period imposed by the statute as a "waiting period" during which collective bargaining sessions become "hollow gestures"" 8 because there is no pressure on the
parties to settle a dispute. The provisions requiring a secret ballot
election among employees on whether to accept an employer's last
offer of settlement also have invoked criticism. Critics argue that
the election is "futile," because employees ordinarily will vote in
accordance with their labor union's desires, "7 and knowing this
employers will not present their best last offer." 8 In theory, the
election could promote industrial peace by ascertaining the true
positions of the parties. In reality, it may be merely a vote of confidence" 9' in the union."12
The 1974 amendments incorporate many of the positive attributes of the National Emergency Dispute provisions while omitting
the most controversial provisions. 2 ' First, the amendments create
three cooling-off periods 21 during which parties to a labor dispute
are required to participate in meetings with the FMCS aimed at
bringing the parties to agreement. 3 By exerting pressure on the
parties, the FMCS can ensure that bargaining sessions during
cooling-off periods do not become "hollow gestures." Second, the
FMCS is authorized to empanel a board of inquiry, 24 which is empowered to make recommendations. 5 Thus a board of inquiry empaneled pursuant to the 1974 amendments, unlike its counterpart
under the National Emergency Dispute provisions, plays a vital role
115.

Marshall, supra note 110, at 453.

116. See Lewis, supranote 111, at 689 n.3; Rehmus, supranote 108, at 1059; Note, supra
note 108, at 73.
117. See CULLEN, supra note 112, at 66; Lewis, supra note 111, at 690 n.3; Marshall,
supra note 110, at 455; Rehmus, supra note 108, at 1060-62.
118. See CULLEN, supra note 112, at 66; Rehmus, supra note 108, at 1062.
119. Rehmus suggests that the only situation in which the employees would accept the
employer's final offer would arise when there is internal dissension. Rehmus, supra note 108,
at 1062.
120. See CULLEN, supra note 112, at 66; Rehmus, supra note 108, at 1062.
121. For example, the 1974 amendments do not provide for a final offer election to be
held.
122. See notes 31-41 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
124. 29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (Supp. V 1975); see notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (Supp. V 1975).
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in labor dispute settlement. 2 6 The foregoing provisions promoting
dispute settlement, together with the weaknesses inherent in the
National Emergency Dispute provisions, eliminate the emergency
dispute provisions as a viable alternative to strike regulation in the
health care industry.
B.

Building an Additional Cooling-Off Period into the 1974
Amendments

A second alternative legislative proposal is a modified version
of the National Emergency Dispute provisions. This alternative,
presented by Senator Dominick as a proposed addition to the 1974
health care amendments, provides for an additional sixty-day cooling period'"2 and vests in the director of the FMCS discretion to
establish a board of inquiry to investigate the issues involved in a
dispute when, in his opinion, "a threatened or actual strike . . .
will, if permitted to occur or continue, substantially interrupt the
delivery of health care in the locality concerned ..
"12 By the
terms of the proposal, a labor organization and a health care institu2
tion involved in a dispute must maintain the status quo'1
for thirty
days while the board investigates the issues in the dispute and thirty
days thereafter.'30
The purposes of a sixty-day cooling-off period, according to
Senator Dominick, are to build an additional safeguard into the Act,
to aid the FMCS in its mediative attempts by providing the board
of inquiry with another opportunity to make recommendations and
to engage in fact finding, to aid in the resolution of significant local
level strikes, and to ensure continuous patient care to the public.'3 '
The proposed amendment substantially parallels the National
Emergency Dispute provisions,' 32 and by so doing, it suffers from
many of the defects inherent in the provisions.'3 3 For example, because the 1974 amendments already have internalized three coolingoff periods, an additional sixty days of FMCS intervention probably
126. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
127. 120 CONG. REC. 12,970-77 (1974).
128. Id. at 12,970.
129. The maintenance of the status quo would mean that the employees could not strike
and the employer could not make excessive preparations or lock the employees out (an
unlikely occurrence).
130. 120 CONG. REc. 12,970 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Dominick).
131. Id. Senator Dominick's primary concern was with emergency health care strikes
as defined in this Note. See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 84-93 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 110-20 supra.
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would not achieve dramatic results. Furthermore, an additional
sixty-day waiting period could heighten tension and prolong negotiations."' Governmental intervention imposing another cooling-off
period therefore would not be an effective means of assisting in the
resolution of a health care dispute.
C.

Compulsory Arbitration

The third alternative legislative proposal is compulsory arbitration of a health care dispute. Compulsory interest arbitration is a
process in which an impartial panel, appointed by the President, is
charged with the duty of arriving at a settlement to be imposed on
the parties to the dispute.'35 Congress could either enact an additional amendment imposing compulsory arbitration on the parties
whenever an emergency strike occurs, or it could enact legislation
on an ad hoc basis under the commerce clause.'3 6
Most commentators advocating this method would impose it
only as a last resort. 3 ' For example, if the parties repeatedly have
failed to reach agreement through the bargaining process, it probably is more desirable to subject them to an imposed contract for a
few years rather than to allow their intransigence to paralyze the
entire economy. 8 In such circumstances, the parties arguably have
abrogated their right to control the terms of the settlement. 9
Conversely, the primary criticism of compulsory arbitration is
that it undermines the collective bargaining process. Rather than
bargaining and suffering the consequences of an economic test of
strength, the weaker party, knowing that the dispute will be compulsorily arbitrated, will maintain an extreme position and allow
the arbitrator to reach a compromise position. "' In this vein, the
differences between the parties are maximized, and the true needs
of the parties may be obscured by their failure to negotiate an acceptable midpoint.''
134. 120 CONG. Rac. 12,971 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
135. See Note, Ad Hoc Compulsory ArbitrationStatutes: The New Device for Settling
National Emergency Labor Disputes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 905, 906-07.
136. Id. at 914.
137. Note, supra note 108, at 74; cf. Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public
Labor Relations, 85 HARv. L. REv. 459, 467 (1971) (compulsory arbitration is an inherently
unstable method for dispute resolution).
138. Note, supra note 108, at 75.
139. Id.
140. CULLEN, supra note 112, at 96-97; Bernstein, supra note 137, at 467; Lewis, supra
note 111, at 692; Silberman, National Emergency Disputes-The ConsiderationsBehind a
Legislative Proposal,4 GA. L. Rv. 673, 682-83 (1970).
141. Lewis, supra note 111, at 692.
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In addition, compulsory arbitration forces the government to
play a major role in determining the content of a collective bargaining agreement, contrary to one of the basic purposes of the
NLRA-to promote industrial peace through collective bargaining
free from government intervention."' The parties engaged in the
bargaining process likely will be jealous of their right to determine
their terms and conditions of employment, and consequently, they
will be unwilling to abide by a contract ultimately formulated by
1 3
the government.
Although compulsory arbitration would dispel public concern
and probably would ensure continuity of patient care,' 4 its desirability as an alternative to regulation of health care strikes is questionable in light of the rights of both health care institutions and
employees'45 that would be sacrificed by its adoption. Health care
institutions and employees are aware of the unique role health care
plays in society, and their willingness to make some accommodations to the needs of the community probably will ensure continuity
of patient care.'46 Moreover, it may not be desirable to dispel public
concern because public pressure to settle a dispute is a valuable tool
to bring the parties to voluntary agreement.'47
D. Final Offer Selection
A fourth alternative by which health care strikes might be regulated, final offer selection, is analogous to compulsory arbitration.
Final offer selection, like compulsory arbitration, is a process
whereby an impartial tribunal decides the final terms of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement. Unlike compulsory arbitration,
however, each term of the contract is not arbitrated separately.
Instead, the tribunal adopts one party's proposal' in its entirety.
After the parties have submitted their proposals to the tribunal,
they are required to bargain for a period of days with a designated
mediator. During this period, the parties have a final opportunity
to reach agreement and thus to avoid the possibility of being sub142. Silberman, supra note 140, at 683.
143. See Lewis, supra note 111, at 692; Note, supra note 135, at 905.
144. There is, of course, no guarantee that employees will not strike illegally. See 120
CONG. REc. 12,940 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
145. This alternative would necessitate the forfeiture of the employee's right to strike.
146. Employee awareness and willingness to make accommodations is evidenced in the
four union letters of assurance. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
147. The value of public pressure also was recognized in the context of settling disputes
under the National Emergency Dispute provisions. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
148. Under most final offer schemes, each party would submit two proposals.
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jected to the other party's more "reasonable" proposals. Because
the more reasonable offer is adopted without modification, each
party will, at least in theory, strive to present a middle ground
proposal rather than assume an extreme position.'4 9
Although final offer selection is less likely to undermine the
collective bargaining process than compulsory arbitration, which
discourages the parties from reaching a compromise position, critics
predict that this method also would be subject to a kind of sophisticated gamesmanship between the parties. 5 " Rather than reaching
a reasonable position early in the bargaining sessions, the parties
will state that their positions are firm until the final offers are made.
At this time, each party, knowing that one proposal will be adopted
in its entirety, will present its most reasonable overall proposal,
which will include advantages on minor issues otherwise unacceptable to the other party. 5' Thus the parties can manipulate final offer
selection to achieve results they cannot attain through bargaining."1
In order to evaluate the utility of the final offer selection proposal in the context of an emergency health care strike, legislators
must determine whether gamesmanship will occur, and if so,
whether it will undermine the proposal. In addition, the advantages
of using this alternative as a regulatory device should be appraised.
First, the proposal avoids interruption of crucial health care serv"' Second, it exerts equal pressure on both a health
ices. 53
care institution and its employees to act reasonably or be subjected to the other
party's final offer for a term of years.'54 Third, government imposition of contract terms can be avoided if the parties make concessions
during the period designated for negotiations after final offers are
submitted.'5 5 These advantages, however, may be offset by the degree of government involvement they inject into the bargaining process and their requirement that employees forfeit the right to
strike.'
149. Lewis, supra note 111, at 699-70; Silberman, supranote 140, at 688-90; cf. Rehmus,
Railway Labor Act Modifications:Helpful or Harmful?, 25 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 85, 92-93
(1971) (compromise offers more likely in salary disputes than in rules disputes).
150. See, e.g,, Lewis, supra note 111, at 699-700.
151. Rebmus suggests that experienced arbitrators would not willingly impose a contract on a party if it contained many minor injustices. Rehmus, supra note 149, at 93.
152. See Lewis, supra note 111, at 700; Rehmus, supra note 149, at 93.
153. This statement is qualified only to the extent that strikes always can occur illegally. See note 144 supra.
154. See Silberman, supra note 140, at 688.
155. Id. at 689.
156. Evaluated in accordance with the hierarchy of values stated at the beginning of
section IV, neither a governmentally imposed contract nor total forfeiture of the right to strike
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A Non-Stoppage Strike

The fifth alternative legislative proposal, a non-stoppage strike,
although originally proposed as a device to be utilized in the public
sector,' 57 also may be an appropriate means of regulating an emergency health care strike. In the non-stoppage strike, operations continue as usual, but the employees specify a certain percentage of
each employee's wages to be deducted from his salary, and paid into
a special fund along with a comparable amount contributed by the
employer. Financial penalties are imposed on both parties for failing
to settle their dispute by certain specified deadlines.'5 8 This alternative thus imposes economic pressures on both parties similar to the
pressures experienced during a strike without interrupting services. "' Moreover, employees can exert additional pressure by increasing the specified percentage of wages directed into the special
160
fund.
Although a non-stoppage strike would ensure the continuity of
vital health care services, would simulate the economic pressures of
a strike, and would produce an agreement through the bargaining
of the parties, its effectiveness in the private sector may be limited.'"' The first major obstacle to utilization of a non-stoppage
strike in the health care industry is that of administration.'
In
order to apply economic pressure on a health care institution, administrators would be required to derive a formula by which to
account for the amount of profits the employer is spared from losing.' 3 Such a determination should be made whether the economic
pressure will be equalized or will be calculated according to the
parties' relative bargaining strengths.'6 4 The second major obstacle
is enforceability of a non-stoppage strike.'65 It would be difficult, if
not impossible, to ensure that "striking" health care employees are
working at their usual levels of efficiency when their take-home pay
is a desirable outcome. They must, however, be weighed against the advantages to be gained
by adoption of this regulatory device.
157. Bernstein, supra note 137, at 469-70.
158. CULLEN, supra note 112, at 103.
159. Id. at 104; Bernstein, supra note 137, at 470; Lewis, supra note 111, at 698.
160. Bernstein, supra note 137, at 470.
161. See CULLEN, supra note 112, at 104-06; Bernstein, supra note 137, at 473.
162. CULLEN, supra note 112, at 104-05; Lewis, supra note 111, at 698.
163. Bernstein, supra note 137, at 473. The problem of accounting for profits is nonexistent in the public sector, and thus bargaining strengths can be assessed more evenly. Id.
164. Id.
165. CuLLEN, supra note 112, at 105; Lewis, supra note 111, at 698.
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is reduced by a significant percentage'66 and when they are deprived
of the "psychological release" experienced by employees participating in a walk-out.'67 The health care institution is confronted with
the dilemma whether to discipline employees who are less efficient
in their work or who participate in absenteeism.' 6
Although the alternative of a non-stoppage strike produces a
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the parties, rather
than an agreement imposed by the government, the administrative
difficulties manifested in the proposal may be insurmountable. Because of the uncertainties involved in this proposal, it should not be
considered as a viable regulatory device for the health care industry
at the present time.
F.

The PartialStrike

The final alternative examined in this Note is the partial strike.
Under this proposal, the government would determine what degree
of operation was "minimally" necessary in order to continue vital
services to the community while the parties attempted to resolve
their dispute.' 9 During the partial strike, certain employees would
be selected to work under the old employment conditions, and others would stay out on strike.' 0 The labor organization thus has the
advantage of exerting economic pressure on the employer while the
bargaining is in process and settlement is reached, but an emergency is averted by the continued partial operation of the employer's business."'
Critics of the partial strike alternative point out the difficulty
in determining what level of operation is necessary to avert an emergency and, at the same time, maintain the proper level of economic
pressure on the employer.' Determining which employees will work
and be paid or which facility will continue operations also poses a
difficult problem.' Furthermore, the employees selecting to work
166. Lewis, supra note 111, at 698.
167. CULLEN, supra note 112, at 105.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 85; Silberman, supra note 140, at 686.
170. Lewis, supra note 111, at 696-97; Silberman, supra note 140, at 686.
171. See CULLEN, supra note 112, at 85, 118-20; Silberman, supra note 140, at 687-88.
172. Lewis, supra note 111, at 697; Silberman, supra note 140, at 687. Moreover, the
pressure of partial operation could, in some cases, be greater than the economic pressure of a
complete shutdown. CULLEN, supra note 112, at 119; Lewis, supranote 111, at 697; Silberman,
supra note 140, at 687; cf. Rehmus, supranote 149, at 92 (no guidance for such determination
in transportation disputes).
173. CULLEN, supra note 112, at 119; Lewis, supra note 111, at 697; Silberman, supra
note 140, at 687.
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while their peers are striking may experience diminished incentive
to maintain their usual level of efficiency. The employer, as in the
case of non-stoppage strikes, is faced with the dilemma whether to
discipline inefficient employees."' Finally, partial operation may
lessen public pressure to settle the dispute and thereby prolong the
strike.'75
Despite these criticisms of the partial strike provision, it might
be the most appropriate 7 ' regulatory device for resolving emergency
health care strikes. Although the determination of the degree of
operation necessary to continue vital services would be nearly impossible in some industries, the determination probably could be
made with reasonable accuracy for the health care institutions involved in a labor dispute.'77 Moreover, because the unions involved
have displayed a willingness to cooperate to ensure patient safety,,7
health care employees undoubtedly would cooperate and voluntarily increase health care operations if a natural disaster or major
79
accident occurred.1
The second concern of this proposal's critics can also be dismissed. Although continued partial operation may be more expensive for health care institutions,10 financial concern is outweighed
by society's dependence on health care services. Furthermore, the
municipality or community benefited by the continued operation
might be able to reimburse the employer from the public treasury,
thereby ameliorating any financial difficulties.
The two most noteworthy advantages to be gained from utilization of a partial strike are: (1) that the process of free collective
bargaining is encouraged and the settlement of the dispute is negotiated; and (2) that the health care employees are not deprived of the
strike as an economic weapon. This alternative thus presents a viable solution to the need for regulation of an emergency strike in the
health care industry.
174. See Lewis, supra note 111, at 697.
175. Public pressure on both parties can assist in negotiating a settlement. See notes
112 & 147 supra.
176. "Appropriateness" is obviously a value judgment made in accordance with the
hierarchy of values set forth at the beginning of section IV supra.
177. There have been many studies made of hospital efficiency levels. See, e.g., notes
25-27 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, the government probably could estimate the
minimum number of health care employees necessary to maintain partial operation by examining hospitals' admission records.
178. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
179. Id.
180. See text accompanying notes 172-73 supra.
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CONCLUSION

Arguably, an emergency strike in the health care industry
might never occur. If an emergency strike does not occur, the 1974
amendments will adequately protect all parties to a dispute and
foster free collective bargaining. In the event such a strike does
occur, however, it cannot be regulated effectively by existing legislation under either federal or state law. With the objectives of providing minimal governmental interference and of retaining the employees' right to exert economic pressure on the health care institution, this Note has examined various alternative legislative proposals to regulate an emergency strike. Only the final offer selection
proposal and the partial strike proposal satisfy these objectives in
the unique context of the health care industry, and they alone
should be considered as viable alternatives for the regulation of
health care strikes.
SUSAN A. JONES

